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A World in Turmoil: Technology, Digital Transformation & Geopolitical Reshaping

Feb 02-2026   



The second joint symposium co-hosted by Peking University's National School of Development, Harvard Kennedy School, and the National University of Singapore was successfully held. Focusing on the theme “A World in Turmoil: Technology, Digital Transformation and Geopolitical Reshaping”, the symposium was attended by 50 experts and scholars from China, the United States, Singapore, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Participants unanimously agreed that the future trajectory of the international political and economic order will largely be determined by the dynamics between China and the United States. Consequently, maintaining cooperation and managing conflicts between the two nations serves the interests of both countries and the wider world. One participant noted that while the United States is the principal architect of the current international order and has not yet faced a formidable challenger, it is losing ground in the recent China-U.S. rivalry. This is due to its withdrawal from certain international affairs, inconsistent economic policy decisions, and estrangement from traditional allies. Concurrently, this has paradoxically highlighted China's image as a stabilising force in the world. Should the United States withdraw further in the future, other nations could collectively sustain the existing multilateral, open international economic system. This would require close cooperation between countries with shared interests and positions, such as China, the European Union, and ASEAN.

Participants suggested that China should enhance communication with the international community by conveying clear and consistent policy messages, particularly regarding its approach to international affairs. They also recommended that China pay close attention to the concerns of its economic partners regarding employment, income, and inequality in international economic transactions, so as to achieve genuine win-win cooperation.

Experts cautioned that the current international monetary system is undergoing a once-in-a-century transformation. Although the U.S. dollar remains the world's most important reserve currency, certain actions by the U.S. government could undermine its status as a global reserve asset. Meanwhile, escalating geopolitical conflicts and the adoption of digital technologies have led to fragmentation in cross-border payment systems, resulting in multiple channels and formats. This could increase risks within the international financial architecture. Experts suggest that China should accelerate the internationalisation of the renminbi, particularly by leveraging its status as a manufacturing powerhouse to strengthen the currency's role as a pricing benchmark in cross-border transactions.

Geopolitical risks have also significantly impacted the landscape of technological innovation between China and the United States. Currently, the likelihood of full convergence between the two systems is extremely low, and it remains unclear whether they will evolve into “two entirely independent” or “partially independent” innovation ecosystems. Other participants noted that the technological innovation rivalry between China and the United States has created considerable difficulties for nations such as those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): the United States is a traditional strategic ally with world-leading technological innovation, while China is a vital economic partner offering high-quality products at competitive prices. The core issue lies in the frequent lack of interoperability between the two systems.

Some attendees also noted a significant change in the behaviour of U.S. businesses within the China-U.S. economic relationship. In contrast, many Chinese enterprises are expanding overseas. However, this emerging “China plus N” framework is not solely attributable to U.S. policies; it also reflects China's entry into a new phase of economic development and represents strategic moves in the global deployment of its supply chains.

With regard to industrial policy, one participant observed that market failures—such as the free market's inability to adequately address issues like national defence or climate change—create opportunities for industrial policy intervention. Nevertheless, specific circumstances require case-by-case analysis, ideally guided by cost-benefit assessments. Another participant highlighted two main reasons for dissatisfaction with industrial policy: its frequent failure to achieve intended objectives and the perceived “beggar-thy-neighbour” effects. An examination of China's development of green energy industries shows that while the policies could be improved, the resulting green energy sectors effectively provide a global public good and benefit green energy transitions worldwide. Furthermore, industrial policy does not necessarily spell the end of economic globalisation.

Several participants also highlighted the distinctive contribution of the Chinese government, particularly local authorities, to promoting economic innovation. Some argued that local government support for innovation—including the provision of funding and policy coordination—may yield more effective outcomes. Research by other attendees revealed that local venture capital funds tend to concentrate in regions with relatively low economic development, investing in innovative enterprises that initially perform less well. Yet, after five years, these firms often demonstrate greater growth potential. Other participants suggested that the shift from historical infrastructure support to current technological innovation funding means that it remains difficult to definitively conclude on the fiscal risk exposures of local governments. This issue may resurface soon and require resolution.

The meeting also examined the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) innovation on the economy, including its effects on productivity and employment. Currently, AI does not appear to have significantly increased total factor productivity, a phenomenon known as the “Solow Paradox”. This does not imply that AI innovation is without merit, but rather highlights the lag in productivity measurement, institutional adaptation to AI, and the potential productivity costs associated with industrial policy. A more accurate assessment requires extensive data analysis and empirical research. Of greater concern are the potential impacts of AI innovation on occupations and the labour market. These developments necessitate more proactive and robust public policies to address issues such as inequality and aggregate demand, ensuring that AI innovation benefits humanity more effectively and sustainably.


A World in Turmoil: Technology, Digital Transformation & Geopolitical Reshaping

Feb 02-2026   



The second joint symposium co-hosted by Peking University's National School of Development, Harvard Kennedy School, and the National University of Singapore was successfully held. Focusing on the theme “A World in Turmoil: Technology, Digital Transformation and Geopolitical Reshaping”, the symposium was attended by 50 experts and scholars from China, the United States, Singapore, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other countries.

Participants unanimously agreed that the future trajectory of the international political and economic order will largely be determined by the dynamics between China and the United States. Consequently, maintaining cooperation and managing conflicts between the two nations serves the interests of both countries and the wider world. One participant noted that while the United States is the principal architect of the current international order and has not yet faced a formidable challenger, it is losing ground in the recent China-U.S. rivalry. This is due to its withdrawal from certain international affairs, inconsistent economic policy decisions, and estrangement from traditional allies. Concurrently, this has paradoxically highlighted China's image as a stabilising force in the world. Should the United States withdraw further in the future, other nations could collectively sustain the existing multilateral, open international economic system. This would require close cooperation between countries with shared interests and positions, such as China, the European Union, and ASEAN.

Participants suggested that China should enhance communication with the international community by conveying clear and consistent policy messages, particularly regarding its approach to international affairs. They also recommended that China pay close attention to the concerns of its economic partners regarding employment, income, and inequality in international economic transactions, so as to achieve genuine win-win cooperation.

Experts cautioned that the current international monetary system is undergoing a once-in-a-century transformation. Although the U.S. dollar remains the world's most important reserve currency, certain actions by the U.S. government could undermine its status as a global reserve asset. Meanwhile, escalating geopolitical conflicts and the adoption of digital technologies have led to fragmentation in cross-border payment systems, resulting in multiple channels and formats. This could increase risks within the international financial architecture. Experts suggest that China should accelerate the internationalisation of the renminbi, particularly by leveraging its status as a manufacturing powerhouse to strengthen the currency's role as a pricing benchmark in cross-border transactions.

Geopolitical risks have also significantly impacted the landscape of technological innovation between China and the United States. Currently, the likelihood of full convergence between the two systems is extremely low, and it remains unclear whether they will evolve into “two entirely independent” or “partially independent” innovation ecosystems. Other participants noted that the technological innovation rivalry between China and the United States has created considerable difficulties for nations such as those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): the United States is a traditional strategic ally with world-leading technological innovation, while China is a vital economic partner offering high-quality products at competitive prices. The core issue lies in the frequent lack of interoperability between the two systems.

Some attendees also noted a significant change in the behaviour of U.S. businesses within the China-U.S. economic relationship. In contrast, many Chinese enterprises are expanding overseas. However, this emerging “China plus N” framework is not solely attributable to U.S. policies; it also reflects China's entry into a new phase of economic development and represents strategic moves in the global deployment of its supply chains.

With regard to industrial policy, one participant observed that market failures—such as the free market's inability to adequately address issues like national defence or climate change—create opportunities for industrial policy intervention. Nevertheless, specific circumstances require case-by-case analysis, ideally guided by cost-benefit assessments. Another participant highlighted two main reasons for dissatisfaction with industrial policy: its frequent failure to achieve intended objectives and the perceived “beggar-thy-neighbour” effects. An examination of China's development of green energy industries shows that while the policies could be improved, the resulting green energy sectors effectively provide a global public good and benefit green energy transitions worldwide. Furthermore, industrial policy does not necessarily spell the end of economic globalisation.

Several participants also highlighted the distinctive contribution of the Chinese government, particularly local authorities, to promoting economic innovation. Some argued that local government support for innovation—including the provision of funding and policy coordination—may yield more effective outcomes. Research by other attendees revealed that local venture capital funds tend to concentrate in regions with relatively low economic development, investing in innovative enterprises that initially perform less well. Yet, after five years, these firms often demonstrate greater growth potential. Other participants suggested that the shift from historical infrastructure support to current technological innovation funding means that it remains difficult to definitively conclude on the fiscal risk exposures of local governments. This issue may resurface soon and require resolution.

The meeting also examined the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) innovation on the economy, including its effects on productivity and employment. Currently, AI does not appear to have significantly increased total factor productivity, a phenomenon known as the “Solow Paradox”. This does not imply that AI innovation is without merit, but rather highlights the lag in productivity measurement, institutional adaptation to AI, and the potential productivity costs associated with industrial policy. A more accurate assessment requires extensive data analysis and empirical research. Of greater concern are the potential impacts of AI innovation on occupations and the labour market. These developments necessitate more proactive and robust public policies to address issues such as inequality and aggregate demand, ensuring that AI innovation benefits humanity more effectively and sustainably.